Beguiling Religion: The Bifurcations and Biopolitics of Spirituality and Medicine by Lysaught, M. Therese
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty 
Publications and Other Works Faculty Publications 
2012 
Beguiling Religion: The Bifurcations and Biopolitics of Spirituality 
and Medicine 
M. Therese Lysaught 
Loyola University Chicago, mlysaught@luc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/ips_facpubs 
 Part of the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lysaught, M. Therese. Beguiling Religion: The Bifurcations and Biopolitics of Spirituality and Medicine. 
Healing to All Their Flesh: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Spirituality, Theology, and Health, , : 
150-185, 2012. Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty Publications and 
Other Works, 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Loyola eCommons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an 
authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Author Posting ©Templeton Press, 2012. 
M. THERESE LYSAUGHT 
7. BEGUILING RELIGION 
The Bifurcations and Biopolitics of 
Spirituality and Medicine' 
In an article entitled "Meeting My Mother Again," John Carmody, 
once an ordained Catholic priest but now twenty years estranged from 
the church, chronicles his experience of dying of cancer. As he lay in 
his hospital bed, a priest appears and asks ifhe wishes to be anointed. 
"With no thought," he says "yes." The sacrament surprises him. "It 
began almost shamefully casually," he admits, yet it proved to be, in 
his words, "the most moving moment in my month's stay in the hos-
pital." "Indeed" he notes, it '1odged itself among the half-dozen most 
moving religious experiences in my life.'" This from what he describes 
as "a spare, adapted version of the church's ancient ritual" and "at 
most ten minutes of unpretentious prayer.'' 
From the perspective of patients and families, anointing of the sick 
is a powerful religious practice. Again and again, Carmody's experi-
ence is echoed in the corridors of medicine. Every day in the twenty-
first-century United States, this scenario is repeated-in hospitals, 
in hospices, sometimes in parishes, sometimes in homes. Christians 
faced with serious or mortal illness summon their pastor or a priest 
on staff, and sometimes surrounded by family and friends, some-
times accompanied by health care professionals, they are prayed over, 
prayed with, and allow oil to be applied to their foreheads, their hands, 
other bodily sites of pain. 
In my own life, anointing has surfaced in unexpected places. My 
own children, born eight weeks early, were anointed on their second 
day of life by a Catholic priest in a Seventh-Day Adventist hospital. 
I have been particularly struck and moved by the stories of three of 
my friends, three (academic) women, who are each equally ambiguous 
about the church. On separate occasions each of these friends have 
testified to me-unprompted and unaware of the centrality of anoint-
ing to my research agenda-of how strikingly powerful their own par-
ticipation in the sacrament of anointing proved to be as each sat by 
the side of her dying mother. For each, anointing proved to be deeply 
moving in ways they could scarcely articulate. 
Stories and experiences like these-of the power of religious prac-
tices, especially for those experiencing illness or negotiating dying-
have fueled the recent exponential growth in the scholarship and litera-
ture surrounding the relationship of spirituality, theology, health, and 
medicine. As a theologian, I should be encouraged by this interest and 
the ways that it might renew the long-standing relationship between 
faith and medicine, a relationship that flourished for 1,500 years in the 
West but with the emergence of modernity became constructed as a 
conflict. 3 Yet as a theologian who studies the anointing of the sick, I 
must confess that the field of spirituality and medicine-indeed, the 
biopsychosocialspiritual model as a whole-gives me great pause.4 
For this model and this newly emergent field as a whole are structured 
by assumptions, norms, and terminology that marginalize and rela-
tivize a practice like anointing. 
On the one hand, the practice of anointing of the sick is not a "spiri-
tual" practice-it is a "religious" practice. It remains one of the few 
spaces where, on a regular basis, in hospitals secular or not, religion 
irrupts-visually, tactilely, practically, publically, olfactorily-into the 
domain of modern medicine. When it does so, the juxtaposition 
between high-tech, largely effective medicine and this peculiar hold-
over from premodernity can be at best ambiguous or at worst jarring. 
Picture, if you will, the typical scenario: a priest in clerical garb enters 
the highly technologized space of a modern hospital room. For a brief 
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moment, he is allowed to usurp center stage in a sea of medical person-
nel. He smears oil (hardly a hygienic action) on a body that is likely 
pumped full of pharmaceuticals, may be tethered to various forms of 
technology, and has perhaps only a tenuous hold on life. For that brief 
moment, the priest assumes authority over the space of the hospital 
room-the physicians and medical staff step back, perhaps uncomfort-
able or uncertain whether they should be present. He conducts a rite 
that he, as well as the patient and family, believes has the ability to heal. 
The philosophers' favorite conceit-the hypothetical visitor from Mars 
beamed into a contemporary hospital room-would no doubt perceive 
this performance as extraordinarily strange and out of place.' It is per-
mitted, we know, if the patient wishes to have it, as a way of finding 
meaning or coping, but the fundamental disconnects between anoint-
ing and contemporary medicine are otherwise glossed over in silence. 
One might counter that if anointing is best understood as a reli-
gious rather than a spiritual practice, then it might be better mapped 
not to spirituality and medicine but to the subcategory of religion and 
health. Yet here anointing meets an entirely different set of obstacles. 
For as we have seen throughout this volume, the subfield of religion 
and health is largely concerned about efficacy and outcomes. It asks 
the instrumentalist question: do religious practices (or does religious 
participation) have a positive or negative effect on health status and 
health outcomes, on a population basis? Studies seeking to correlate 
church attendance and overall health status or examining the efficacy 
of prayer on clinical outcomes are now abundant. Yet as has no doubt 
been discussed extensively in this volume, to conceive of religious prac-
tices in these instrumentalist terms risks deforming their richer mean-
ing, reducing them to, in Andrew Lustig' s apt phrase,6 little more than 
"health technologies"-useful if they produce a clinically measurable 
benefit but otherwise suspect or dangerous. According to this logic, we 
should conduct a clinical trial of anointing of the sick. What if such a 
study determined that anointed patients had better outcomes-ought 
physicians offer it as a tool within the medical armamentarium? Or 
alternatively, what if the study determined that patient outcomes were 
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worse-should Christian communities stop anointing? Ought it be 
banned as malpractice from clinical contexts ?7 
In short, a traditional religious practice like anointing of the sick, 
practiced within the Christian tradition for millennia, fits tenuously at 
best with the framework provided by the emerging discipline of spiri-
tuality and medicine and, in fact, highlights serious problems with 
the philosophical infrastructure that frames the rules for conceptu-
alizing-and practicing-religion and spirituality in the clinical set-
ting today. I will argue that the theoretical shape of this discourse is 
deeply problematic for those who take religious practices seriously 
for at least three reasons. First, it relies on well-deconstructed dual-
isms, dichotomies, or binaries-a conceptual infrastructure that has 
been effectively debunked by most feminist, postmodern, and other 
contemporary philosophers. Such dualisms, as we will see, serve to 
position religion such that it lies on the nonnormative side of the 
divide-thereby devaluing and disempowering religion vis a vis spiri-
tuality. Second, I will argue that the discourse on spirituality and med-
icine emerged when it did and in the way it did because it provided a 
crucial component of the consolidation of the biopolitical character 
of modern medicine. As we will see, thirdly, this aspect of the field 
of spirituality and medicine mirrors a similar trend seen in the field of 
bioethics. The biopsychosocialspiritual model in medicine emerged 
alongside the field of bioethics in the mid-to-late 1970s, both serving 
to effectively marginalize religion, theology, and modes of substantive 
rationality except where they could be transformed into instrumen-
tal modalities. In the end, I will propose that, properly understood, 
the practice of anointing-as well as other authentic religious prac-
tices-ought well be seen as deeply subversive of the configuration of 
contemporary accounts of spirituality and medicine. 
BINARIES, BIFURCATIONS, DICHOTOMIES, AND DUALISMS: 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONING OF RELIGION 
The literature on spirituality and medicine or religion and health is 
structured according to now well-deconstructed dualisms, dichoto-
Beguiling Religion 153 
mies, or binaries.• This is not a little ironic, insofar as the turn to the 
biopscyhosocialspiritual model in the 1970s was proposed as a way to 
overcome a number of dichotomies or binary oppositions deemed 
problematic in twentieth-century medicine, particularly its reduc-
tionistic materialism found in its focus on the body as a machine. 9 In 
the following section, I sketch four intertwined dualisms that shape 
the field of spirituality and medicine: (1) form versus content (or sub-
stance or matter), (2) mind versus body, (3) subjective versus objective, 
and (4) private versus public. 10 As with most dualistic structures, one 
pole of each binary is consistently privileged as normative-in this 
case, it is the formal, the mental, the subjective, the private that mer-
its positive valuation. Not surprisingly, these emerge as the charac-
teristics of "spirituality." More or less subtly, the opposite pole-that 
which maps content, body, objectivity, and public-is devalued, posi-
tioned, carefully delimited, and circumscribed. It is here that we find 
"religion," including substantively religious practices like the anoint-
ing of the sick. Although each of these binaries could be described in 
much greater detail and a legion of examples educed from the litera-
ture in support, allow me to briefly summarize each. 
Spirituality as Formal 
The distinction between form and matter (or form/content or form/ 
substance) has a long history within the Western philosophical tra-
dition. While the meaning of the terms and relationships between 
them shifted from Plato to Aristotle to Descartes to Hobbes to the 
logical empiricists and beyond, it is Kant's revision of the terms that 
continues to inform contemporary discourse. Formal entities are, 
for Kant, abstract, necessary, universal concepts, forms of intuition, 
innate in the human mind, and, importantly, independent of human 
experience (therefore a priori). They are true for everyone, everywhere 
regardless of content. Mathematical truths, for example, are formal: 
2 + 2 always equals 4 independent of the things added, whether one is 
counting boxes, money, or human beings. 
Assertions of the formal, a priori nature of spirituality are ubiqui-
154 M. THERESE LYSAUGHT 
tous within the field of spirituality and medicine. Christina Puchalski, 
an internist and geriatrician who has pioneered the practice of spiri-
tual assessment, especially in end-of-life care, succinctly captures this 
conviction: 
I see spirituality as that which allows a person to experience transcendent 
meaning in life. This is often expressed as a relationship with God, but it can 
also be about nature, art, music, family or community-whatever beliefs 
and values give a person a sense of meaning and purpose in life. 11 
Chaplain Thomas St. James O'Connor concurs, finding among his 
research subjects: "All believe that everyone is spiritual whether that 
person recognizes it or not, for meaning-making is an essential part of 
being human."12 Or, finally, palliative care physician Tomasz R. Okon 
notes that for the literature on spirituality and medicine: "Regardless 
of one's particular spiritual orientation, every individual has to make 
a decision as to whether one's life has meaning and value that extends 
beyond self, life and death. Even a focused and resolute answer negat-
ing such meaning places one in relation to the transcendent."" 
In other words, try as one might, one cannot escape being spiri-
tual. This, of course, is a Kantian sort of claim, a formal claim-it 
holds that spirituality is a fundamental, inalienable human category, 
something fundamental to who we are as human persons. It holds that 
spirituality is a neutral, universal constituent of human being; its con-
tent doesn't matter. 14 In this way, spirituality holds a similar position 
to that of the faculty of autonomy in bioethics. It is this formal nature 
that allows "spirituality" to be assessed more or less scientifically. 
One can, of course, escape being religious. Religions are clearly not 
universal, necessary, innate. They are particular and chosen; one is ini-
tiated into a religion through a series of rites or practices. One might 
convert from religion A to religion B, one's Catholicism might lapse, 
or one might decide to declare oneself an agnostic or atheist. Religions 
are, by definition and at times by proclamation, particular, defined by 
highly contingent histories (e.g., the Incarnation, Gautama's decision 
to seek Enlightenment). Religions are, if anything, defined by their 
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content and substantive claims-their particular beliefs, practices, 
histories, convictions, and communities. 
Thus, in casting spirituality as part of the transcendental a priori 
structure of the human person, the field of spirituality and medicine 
creates problems for religion. While required to respect that all per-
sons are spiritual, health care professionals must remain skeptical or 
agnostic about particular religious claims and practices. But, as with 
all formal claims, this approach also creates problems for spiritual-
ity. As Wilfred McSherry and Keith Cash note in their 2004 compre-
hensive review of the taxonomy of the language of spirituality: "the 
term 'spirituality' as used within nursing is problematic and in danger 
of becoming so broad and empty that it is meaningless," and that "a 
universal definition of spirituality may be theoretically and culturally 
impossible. "15 
Spirituality as a Mental Construct 
Advocates of spirituality in medicine often champion the new atten-
tion to spirituality as a way of overcoming the problematic dualism of 
mind versus body so often encountered in medicine, a rupture often 
attributed to the work of Rene Descartes. As Puchalski notes: "More 
physicians are becoming aware of the unity of the human person-
that is, body and spirit-and therefore are integrating spiritual care 
into their practice of medicine."16 
However, the current construct of spirituality in medicine furthers 
this dualism. It does so in three ways. First, spirituality is cast as a 
categorical orientation of the human person located in the faculty of 
decision. Recall Okon's comment earlier: 
Regardless of one's particular spiritual orientation, every individual has to 
make a decision as to whether one's life has meaning and value that extends 
beyond self, life and death. Even a focused and resolute answer negating 
such meaning places one in relation to the transcendent.17 
Again, the content of one's orientation or decision-the choice one 
actually makes-is irrelevant; one can even "negate such meaning." 
156 M. THERESE LYSAUGHT 
What matters is that a decision, a choice is made!' A "decision," of 
course, is an activity of the reason and the will-in other words, spiri-
tuality is located as mental construct. Such a position is, once again, a 
good Kantian position. 
Spirituality is further distanced from the body by the bifurcation of 
spirituality from religion or religiosity. O'Connor and associates help-
fully articulate the standard distinction: 
Spirituality is viewed as distinct from religiosity. Religiosity is an expression 
of faith through the practices of a particular religion or denomination .... 
[S]pirituality as meaning-making does not necessarily have to be expressed 
in a religious or denominational context. 19 
Thus, one might be spiritual but not religious (believing in a higher 
being without religious affiliation or practices), religious but not spiri-
tual (participating in external religious practices without conscious 
commitment to meaning-making), or both spiritual and religious.2° 
Here the term "spiritual" pertains primarily to "meaning" or some-
times is expanded to include "beliefs"-both of which are, again, 
mental constructs-while the term "religious" is typically applied to 
the external social, cultural, and/or institutional aspects of transcen-
dent concerns, to the rituals, devotions, or practices of a tradition-in 
other words, to those things that people do with their bodies. 
Thus in all of these configurations, spirituality remains a mental 
construct abstracted by definition from practices, embodiment, com-
munity, formation, and more.21 Mind-body dualism has not been 
overcome, but is in fact reinforced. 
Spirituality as Subjective 
The subjective-objective dichotomy operates in the field of spirituality 
and medicine in two ways. First, it structures the discourse itself. The 
very framing of the question-spirituality and medicine-is predi-
cated on this polarity. It presupposes that spirituality and medicine 
are two different realms that somehow must be connected. Medicine, 
via the empirical method and biological reductionism, firmly staked 
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its claim to the mantle of objectivity throughout the twentieth century. 
As a mental construct, spirituality cannot but be firmly lodged in indi-
vidual subjectivity, while medicine and science map without remain-
der the objective side of the Cartesian divide. Pastoral counselor Gary 
Shogren notes: "[Even] in an age when medical technology has taken 
on religious connotations of its own ... religion and science [remain] 
neatly divided into Cartesian categories, with healing generally falling 
into the realm of science."22 Moreover, the turn to spirituality in medi-
cine in the 1970s and 1980s was and remains part of a broader series 
of initiatives intentionally designed to integrate patients' subjective 
experiences, feelings, and values into the clinical context. Spirituality, 
as illustrative questions from a variety of spiritual assessment instru-
ments indicates, concerns subjective experiences and feelings: "How 
close do you feel to God?"; ''A reason I pray by myself is because I enjoy 
praying"; "I feel thankful for my blessings"; and so forth. 23 
This distinction that places religion/spirituality in the space of sub-
jectivity and science/medicine in objectivity relies on and reinforces 
particular epistemological assumptions ubiquitous in this literature, 
namely, that science and medicine make truth claims, while the same 
cannot be said about spirituality or religion. At best, advocates will 
affirm that spirituality provides individuals with "their own" truth, 
but this truth follows decidedly different epistemological rules; it is, 
if it exists, more "mystical" and therefore about it we must be apo-
phatic. 24 Here the objective pole is-at least momentarily-privi-
leged with regard to truth, but the subjective pole is privileged with 
regard to meaning. 
At the same time, however, the subject-object polarity also struc-
tures the relationship between spirituality and religion. Spirituality 
continues to occupy the subjective pole, while religion becomes associ-
ated with the objective. Being linked to the objective, however, does not 
award religion with the status of truth that is conferred to medicine 
(although religion is often critiqued for making unwarranted truth 
claims). Instead, subjectively construed spirituality becomes privi-
leged vis a vis meaning and truth insofar as spirituality itself represents 
4"' 
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a truth about the human condition. Spiritual practices, feelings, and 
experiences chosen by patients assume a sort of noumenal unassail-
ability. Religion, on the other hand, in its messy contingency and par-
ticularity and reliance on revelation (at least in part), becomes increas-
ingly surd. It remains tolerated as a present yet accidental feature of 
many patients' lives, yet one senses in the literature an undercurrent of 
impatience. This predisposition makes itself clearest in allied contexts, 
for example, in bioethics where it is religion, especially objective teach-
ings of religious authorities-not spirituality-that creates so many 
of the "dilemmas" in bioethics." As Daniel Hall, Harold Koenig, and 
Keith Meador note in their article "Conceptualizing 'Religion': How 
Language Shapes and Constrains Knowledge in the Study of Religion 
and Health": 
In oversimplified terms, the Enlightenment paradigm approaches religion 
as a sort of "frosting" that may or may not be applied to the "vanilla cake" 
of generic human experience (Wolterstorff 2ooia, 7). The frosting may come 
in several different flavors (Christian, Buddhist, Muslim), but the vanilla 
cake remains the same from person to person. In fact, the frosting is even 
optional to the extent that an atheist may choose to enjoy the cake without 
any frosting at all. Religion is thus perceived as a type of knowledge that may 
be added to the foundation built by reason and empiricism-but because 
it is not universal, religion is considered both optional and less trustworthy 
than the foundational knowledge shared by all humans and verified by our 
common sensory experience.26 
Hall and associates testify to the ongoing struggle regarding the 
truth-claims religion seeks to make as a source of knowledge. Thus, 
while placed on the scientific side of the subjective-objective divide, 
religious epistemology is insufficiently empirical to prove a trustwor-
thy source of knowledge. Equally, spirituality's nature as a founda-
tional human intuition shared by all humans renders it more trust-
worthy than religion. Too savvy, however, to pretend to compete 
head-to-head with an empirical scientific epistemology, those who 
promote spirituality in medicine direct its purview away from knowl-
edge toward the domains of "meaning" and "coping."" As we will see, 
Beguiling Religion 159 
the field of spirituality and medicine attempts to compensate for this 
self-avowed subjectivity by adopting the quasi-empirical tool of spiri-
tual assessment or the more rigorous double-blind clinical trials. Not 
surprisingly, the methodologies and validity of many such studies are 
being called into question. 
Spirituality as Radically, Individually Private 
A category that is both mentalist and subjective cannot be other than 
private and radically individual. As O'Connor and colleagues hold: 
Each person makes sense of his or her life .... [S]pirituality [thus] is private 
and involves judgment. The meaning of one's life, the meaning of one's rela-
tionship with self, others and God, and the meaning one attaches to experi-
ence and events are personal and often private.28 
Intriguingly, while O'Connor's ethnographic research found sup-
port for this perspective among patients, an agnostic amongst their 
cohort challenged this presupposition: "One patient, who is an agnos-
tic, enjoyed talking about issues concerning life's meaning. He invited 
the researcher to debate with him the existence of God. Spirituality for 
him was a public matter, not a private one."29 Again, as with the asser-
tion that all persons are spiritual, the data confound the assumptions. 
The claim that spirituality is private and individual makes possible 
the position that assessing and addressing patient spirituality is essen-
tial for enhancing patient autonomy. Yet here again we meet another 
irony, insofar as spiritual claims are inherently heteronomous. In 
"relating themselves to the transcendent" (whatever it is) individuals 
by definition cede or at least acknowledge the power that transcendent 
holds over their lives. 
It is this heteronomy that is captured in the root of the term "reli-
gion"-re-ligio-re-ligate, to tie together. Religion claims to be that 
which again connects human persons with the transcendent.'0 Unlike 
the heteronomy of spirituality, this heteronomy is not personal or pri-
vate but public. From the earliest uses of the term (eighth to twelfth 
centuries), the term "religion" meant a "state oflife bound by religious 
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vows; the condition of belonging to a religious order."" Religion was 
a public way of life embarked upon by public professions. Over time, 
the term broadened to encompass human "action or conduct" based 
on this connection to the transcendent, be they the public action of 
religious rituals or public adherence to a code ofliving in everyday life. 
Thus, in the field of spirituality and medicine, where spirituality 
is fashioned as formal, mental, subjective, and radically individu-
alistic and private, religion constructed is substantive, embodied, 
objective, and inescapably communal and public. Religion makes 
truth-claims and engages ensouled bodies through visible, exter-
nal, communal public practices-just like its counterpart medicine. 
Although once inextricably intertwined and necessarily subordinated 
to significant and enduring religious practices, the kernel of spiritu-
ality has now been freed from the prison-house husk of religion. As 
such, it poses no threat to the hegemony of medicine within the clini-
cal setting. What is more, by tranquilizing religion, spirituality and 
medicine allows medicine to expand its jurisdiction unimpeded. For 
that account, let us turn to the next section. 
BEHIND BINARIES AND BIFURCATIONS: SPIRITUALITY 
AND MEDICINE AS BIOPOLITICS 
Constructed, confined, circumscribed ... packaged by these philosoph-
ical dualisms, religion is bifurcated from spirituality and marginalized 
or at least very carefully positioned vis a vis the clinical setting. One 
could ascribe this positioning of religion as simply the outcome of the 
unsophisticated adoption of modernist philosophical habits. Yet those 
acquainted with a hermeneutics of suspicion must always ask: whose 
interest does such a positioning serve? Is there more to this history? 
How did such a bifurcation come to be created? Moreover, as noted in 
this book's prologue, the field of spirituality and medicine has grown 
exponentially over the past three decades, in part fueled by funding 
from the National Institutes of Health. One can think about the his-
tory of the field and ask why did it appear when it did? How did the 
field of medicine-having narrated its identity over against religion 
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for the better part of two centuries-come to so blithely accept the 
incorporation of spirituality-as-a-science into its domain? How did 
a government putatively committed to a separation between religion 
and state come to fund research on spirituality and health? 
In this section, I will sketch initial answers to these questions by 
turning to Max Weber and Michel Foucault. Informed by a more so-
ciocritical perspective on this new field of spirituality and medicine, 
one might argue that spirituality has been allowed to enter the realm 
of contemporary medicine in this new way for one simple reason: pack-
aged in this particular philosophical configuration, it enhances the 
scope and power of medicine and solidifies medicine's ability to fur-
ther the ends of the social order. The field of spirituality and medicine 
functions, in other words, as a disciplinary mode of modern, scientific 
"biopolitics," serving to reproduce, in and through individual bodies, 
the ideological commitments of contemporary culture." Moreover, 
this new field of spirituality and medicine parallels the trajectory of 
another discipline that explosively came-to-be during the same time 
period: bioethics. Elsewhere, I have argued that bioethics has become 
a mode ofbiopolitics." Not surprisingly, we find striking parallels in 
the fortunes of religion within both fields. 
Allow me to begin with a brief overview of the notion ofbiopolitics, 
indicating as we go the various ways in which the field of spirituality 
and medicine interfaces with a biopolitical framework. Biopolitics, for 
Foucault, names an integrated set of strategies for policing and con-
trolling populations, for "increasingly ordering all realms under the 
guise of improving the welfare of the individual and the population" 
but whose real and masked purpose is to reproduce and further the 
dominant social order. 04 For Foucault, a vital constituent ofbiopolitics 
from the end of the eighteenth century forward was biomedicine." 
To see the contemporary conversation on spirituality and medi-
cine as a mode of biopolitics is to suggest that behind the rhetoric 
of freedom, empowerment, meaning, and improving the welfare of 
individual patients and the health of the population overall, the con-
temporary turn to spirituality in medicine may not actually advance 
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patients' interests as much as it functions to shape, direct, and man-
age the bodies of real, human persons toward larger and perhaps hid-
den institutional ends. 36 How might this work?37 
Foucault and others identify three necessary elements in biopo-
litical governmentality: discourses, practices, and institutions-ele-
ments we can clearly trace in the conversation on spirituality and 
medicine. Discourses are bodies of concepts, literatures, that define 
and produce objects of knowledge, that govern the ways a topic can 
be meaningfully talked about, reasoned about, studied. They are, in 
other words, academic, scholarly, professional fields. The formation of 
new discourses generally entails a discontinuous trajectory-careful 
historical work will plot the emergence of a new discourse out of the 
decline of an old one. Such histories will be those of ruptures, radical 
breaks, and useful contingencies. However, those who tell the story of 
the new discipline-history is generally written by the winners-will 
recount its emergence as a seamless, natural, logical, necessary next 
step in progress toward truth. 
The discourse on spirituality and medicine was catalyzed in the late 
1970s with George Engel's development of the biopsychosocial model 
for medicine." For Engel and others, the biopsychosocial model of 
medicine arose in response to deficiencies in the functional biological/ 
physiological approach of an increasingly technologizedmedicine that 
reached a particular apex (or nadir, depending on one's viewpoint) in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dogmatic biological reductionism of 
this "biomedical model" fails to account, Engel argues, for nonphysi-
cal dimensions of human illness, healing, and patient experiences, 
excludes nonphysical disorders from medicine, and fails to recognize 
its own cultural constructedness. 39 The newly proposed biopsycho-
social model (later expanded to the biopsychosocialspiritual model) 
provides a way to address all these dimensions of the crisis, naturally 
emerging as a necessary and logical development in the progress of 
modern medicine. Engel's seminal article launched a movement that 
followed the typical discursive path-the exponential development of 
journals, conferences, a professional literature, college classes, centers, 
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and various graduate degrees over the course of the next two decades. 
As with all processes of discursive formation, the knowledge pro-
duced within this field becomes increasingly technical, formal, and 
esoteric, necessarily the purview of specialists and elite professionals. 
Consequently, as in all discursive formation, we find the creation of 
new health care professionals-in this case, chaplains, spiritual care, 
or pastoral care providers-those who have the necessary expertise to 
research and deploy the esoteric findings of this new field. Spirituality 
as a scientific discipline is no longer accessible by mere mortals, or 
even physicians, no matter how personal, subjective, universal, and 
private spirituality is claimed to be. 
Discourses, of course, do not simply float free. In order to organize 
and discipline bodies, they must be incarnated in social practices, in 
what Foucault refers to as "techniques of discipline." Discourses and 
practices stand in reciprocal relationship: discourses define the rules for 
practices, which in turn enact those discourses vis a vis individual bod-
ies. 40 Through the creation of such bodies that then go on to act in the 
world in self-motivated ways, practices further realize (make real) and 
reproduce the vision and commitments of the discourses in the world. 41 
In addition to the "dividing practice" that we have already seen-the 
dichotomization of religiosity and spirituality-two central practices 
or techniques of discipline for the field of spirituality and medicine are 
the now manifold instruments for spiritual assessment and the practice 
of taking a spiritual history. 42 Three dimensions of these practices are 
key to this account. First, the practice of spiritual assessment-at least 
as it very quickly became to be practiced within the biopsychosocial-
spiritual model-is the heir of one of two contributors to medicine-as-
biopolitics identified by Foucault, namely, statistical medicine or the 
numerical method. Physician-philosopher Jeffrey Bishop, in his impor-
tant book The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the 
Dying, provides a helpful account of the role of statistical medicine in 
the consolidation of medicine's power in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, particularly in areas of public health, eugenics/genetics, 
psychology, and sociology.43 More importantly, he carefully demon-
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strates how the putatively numerical and statistical practice of spiritu-
ality scales and instruments becomes the "scientific" method of choice 
within this new model. As he notes, in the late 1970s "we find an explo-
sion of new techniques to assess scientifically everything from grief to 
spirituality. "44 He cites a company called Psychological Assessment 
Resources that offers 428 different assessment tools, forty-nine of which 
are located under the heading "Behavior/Health." And this is but one 
of a myriad of such companies. The number of spiritual assessment 
instruments are now legion. 
Second, often structured according to Likert Scales, such assessment 
vehicles are shaped according to the assumptions contained in the dis-
course on spirituality and medicine. The four-question FICA tool, for 
example, speaks of spirituality, faith, and beliefs rather than religion 
("Do you consider yourself spiritual?") and defines the role of spiritu-
ality as meaning or comfort ("What things do you believe in that give 
meaning to life?"; "Does [your faith center] provide support/comfort 
for you during times of stress?"). 45 Other approaches conceive spiritual-
ity in terms of developmental psychological functioning, a la Fowler's 
Stages of Faith46 or as a method of psychological coping, an assump-
tion captured in the telling acronym of one of the most commonly cited 
assessments developed by two of the leading figures in the spirituality 
and medicine field, Ken Pargament and Harold Koenig, the RCOPE.47 
This limited psychosocial account of religion and spirituality would 
be less troublesome but for one key biopolitical dimension of these 
assessment instruments: they not only are shaped by certain assump-
tions about religion and spirituality, but also seek to reproduce these 
assumptions through the participative shaping of patients. For exam-
ple, insofar as spiritual assessment instruments frame questions in 
terms of feelings, social support, or coping rather than terms of facts 
or truth, they subtly yet effectively may shape the way patients subse-
quently understand the nature and relevance of their own religiosity. 
Equally, patients who do not fit the mold may be subtly (or perhaps 
not so subtly) prodded in a particular direction. For example, nurse 
Carrie Dameron, in providing a succinct account of the very succinct 
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FICA assessment tool, recounts the story of one Mrs. Garcia. When 
asked about her spiritual beliefs, Mrs. Garcia responds: "I don't really 
have any spiritual beliefs or religion, but I like to go to the woods and 
sit quietly, listening to nature. Sometimes I take a meditation book 
and think about the words and sayings." Dameron interprets this find-
ing in, prima facie, a peculiar manner: 
Using the FICA spiritual assessment, we discovered that Ms. Garcia says 
she is not spiritual, yet she practices spirituality in her life. We see that she 
has spiritual support through her friend and through meditation books. Ms. 
Garcia's assessment reveals her spiritual needs, but also communicates that 
the nurse is caring and open to discussing her issues. This begins a rapport 
between the nurse and the patient, laying the foundation for further spiri-
tual discussions and caring nursing interventions. Later the nurse can check 
with Ms. Garcia and see how she is doing, continuing to assess and develop 
a relationship with her. Eventually the nurse might ask permission to talk 
further about spiritual beliefs and offer to pray with Ms. Garcia.48 
Earlier Dameron observed that "many words Christians equate with 
spirituality have a Christian connotation. Examples include: church, 
prayer, worship, Bible, sacraments and God. Alternate words to use are 
faith/spiritual community, spiritual practices, meditation or quiet time, 
music, spiritual literature and higher/influential power or force. "49 In 
both cases, spiritual assessment embodies an attempt to shape patient 
understandings of their own spirituality/religiosity-either by shift-
ing their words away from substantive, particular Christian language 
toward a spiritualized Esperanto or by imposing upon them a spiritu-
ality of which they are in possession unawares, eventually leading to 
religious practice! Similarly, Pargament and colleagues understand 
religious coping to be positive or negative. As they note: "Although the 
concept of coping has a positive connotation, coping can be ineffective 
as well as effective. Religion also has its darker side."'0 Such a perspec-
tive on religion is not simply objective and scientific. Kyle Brothers 
observes astutely: 
For the purposes of RCOPE, its designers narrowed the meaning of religion 
to religious coping. As psychology researchers, they view humans as discrete 
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individuals who function either successfully or unsuccessfully within soci-
ety; it is because of this perspective that Pargament et al. are able to make 
normative claims that some religious coping is positive and some is negative. 
Por these authors, then, the question is not only how religious coping func-
tions in the lives of people undergoing life stressors, but also how religious 
coping helps or hinders functioning in society. 51 
In this way, discursive practices seek to take "unruly" bodies-bod-
ies like those of Mrs. Garcia, of the agnostic cited earlier who believed 
spirituality to be public, or the 25 percent of respondents who classi-
fied themselves as neither spiritual nor religious, or those with nega-
tive religious coping-and change them, to fit them into the concep-
tual commitments of the new orthodoxy, thereby rendering them 
"docile"-amenable to the norms of medicine and the state." 
Finally, discursive practices are assisted in this process largely by 
being embedded in institutions, centralized social spaces that provide 
a visible social sanction for the claims put forward in a particular 
discourse. Such institutionalization is necessary for two reasons. On 
the one hand, it provides a place with authoritative sanction for the 
surveillance that is crucial for the mapping and normalizing of the 
bodies within a given population. On the other, as noted above, insti-
tutionally sanctioned discourses define the "normal," and through 
techniques and practices, they encourage individuals to regulate and 
achieve their own conformity with these established norms." Over 
time, institutionalized discursive practices subtly move individuals to 
adopt certain attitudes and practices (e.g., that spirituality and reli-
gion are two different things) and in this way, they come to be embod-
ied and enacted within the larger culture, prevailing as normal and 
acceptable. In other words, institutionalization has the effect of ren-
dering particular discourses "true." This "truth" is reinforced via the 
ability of institutionalized discursive practices to "predict" normaliz-
ing outcomes and to produce "normal" bodies (to shift persons from 
one set of norms to another), a dance that reinforces the "scientific" 
character of the discourse's growing body of knowledge. 
All these dimensions are captured within the field of spirituality and 
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medicine. While resistance from clinicians continues, spirituality-as-
assessable has clearly become embedded to a significant degree within 
the institutions of medicine and the hospital. Spiritual care profession-
als visit patients, they administer spiritual assessments-both now a 
standard part of the surveillance mechanism of modern medicine as 
well as a method for teaching patients certain normative concepts. Not 
surprisingly, the outcomes of assessment after assessment demonstrate 
the validity of the assessments' presuppositions (e.g., that spirituality 
is a universal component of the human psyche), particularly if admin-
istered to radically different demographic populations. The results of 
these assessments enable practitioners to intervene with patients, to 
normalize those unruly who might prove disruptive to the smooth flow 
of the medical regime. With the institutional backing of statistical sci-
ence and clinical medicine, the findings from spiritual assessments are 
trumpeted as true, a truth reinforced by NIH funding and now thou-
sands of studies published in prestigious sounding academic journals, 
backed by a plethora of "data." 
As such, as Bishop rightly notes, it is not only the case that the bio-
psychosocialspiritual model proposed by Engel provided a solution to 
a crisis of biological reductionism. More significantly, Engel laid the 
groundwork for medicine to become totalizing. With the development 
of the biopsychosocialspiritual model: 
We see the deployment of the statistical sciences-particularly in psychol-
ogy and social work-and the expansion of techniques of assessment to cap-
ture every dimension of human thriving. A biopsychosocialspiritual medi-
cine is born-a medicine that addresses all features of human thriving. It 
sets out to nominally define, to operationally assess, and to statistically mea-
sure the wholeness of human living; it is a medicine devoted to holistic care, 
or perhaps better a medicine devoted to total care. Biopsychosocialspiritual 
medicine measures all things and is the measure of all things. 54 
From the perspective ofbiopower, it becomes easier to see how the 
discourse on spirituality and medicine was permitted to enter into and 
remain within the sacred space of the clinic. Rather than providing a 
necessary corrective to an overly reductionistic biomedicine, spiritual-
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ity allied to practices of surveillance surreptitiously served to provide 
a way for medicine to exponentially expand the jurisdiction of its gaze 
and to finally marginalize the only other long-standing claimant to 
authority over the bodies of citizens: religion. 
In this way, the story of spirituality and medicine parallels in an 
uncanny way the story of bioethics. Likewise launched in the mid-to-
late 1970s and experiencing exponential growth as a field, the trajectory 
of bioethics can also be narrated as one of disciplinary formation via 
the development of esoteric discourses, overseen by a new profession 
of specialists, embodied in techniques of discipline such as informed 
consent, living wills, and research regulations, embedded in institu-
tions such as laboratories, hospitals, and clinics, thereby reproducing 
new norms that serve not primarily the interests of the patients or phy-
sicians but rather the interests of the medical-industrial-government 
complex." 
Equally, for our purposes, this new field of bioethics-although 
born out of the field of theology-quickly moved to marginalize 
religion. By 1990, the "secularization of bioethics" was a recognized 
issue. 56 Kevin Wildes narrates the canonical story of the development 
of bioethics, maintaining that like the biopsychosocialspiritual model 
of medicine, bioethics emerged because of the increased technolo-
gization and biological reductionism of medicine in the 1960s. For 
Wildes, bioethics' initial theological character was pushed aside as a 
necessary, logical advance: 
[B] ioethics has emerged as a field that is distinct from theological ethics and 
traditional physician ethics even though both disciplines were important to 
the development of the field .... [O]ne needs to understand why theological 
voices receded from the field .... The turn toward a secular bioethics became 
a search for a secular or civil religion that might bind the sentiment of citi-
zens who were at least nominally divided by religions, cultures, or other dif-
ferences. 57 
Religion, in other words, is particular and divisive, unlike the uni-
versal category of spirituality, or, as those familiar with bioethics know, 
the main, canonical bioethics principle: autonomy. 58 The resemblances 
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between spirituality and autonomy in these two discourses should not 
go unremarked. Both, of course, are formal, universal, a priori catego-
ries of human nature, mentalist constructions located in the rational 
will, contentless by definition (the content to be specified by each indi-
vidual), completely subjective, and radically individual and private." 
Key to the marginalization of theology and religion within bioeth-
ics was a shift in modes of rationality-from substantive rationality 
to formal, instrumental rationality. Sociologist John H. Evans, in his 
book Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization 
of Public Bioethical Debate, carefully documents how the substantively 
rational arguments and religious language that characterized the early 
stages of bioethics became, by the late 1980s, systematically excluded 
or at least carefully positioned so as to be mostly irrelevant within 
public bioethics, usurped by the formal, instrumental rationality of 
the four principles and an emphasis on bureaucratic procedure. ' 0 A 
similar shift can be traced within the field of spirituality and medi-
cine. As Levin suggests, early voices in this field were more interested 
in metaphilosophical questions (e.g., "What does this really mean?"), 
but these sorts of substantive questions were quickly left behind in 
the turn to formal modes of statistical analysis. The early pioneers in 
this field, as they note, were animated by "more fundamental (and 
one could say existential) questions about the relation of spirit and 
body .... Before the empirical research enterprise that is the contem-
porary religion and health field got started in earnest, about 20 years 
ago, theoretical discussions, especially theological discussions could 
be found on occasion throughout this literature. "'1 
Yet Ken Vaux, Harold Vanderpool, and Paul Tillich in spirituality 
and medicine met the same fate as those like Paul Ramsey, Richard 
McCormick, and even secular geneticists like Hermann Muller in 
the field of bioethics. Substantive, contentful, theologically informed 
accounts ofreligion (and even spirituality) were quickly replaced with 
instrumentalist accounts focusing on the potential positive effects of 
religion or spirituality on health outcomes or the use of spirituality 
to instrumentally manage patient care. This becomes clearest when 
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spirituality itself is deemed "unhealthy." As with Pargament earlier, 
Christina Puchalski also maintains that one can differentiate between 
'"positive' versus 'negative' spirituality": 
[If] spiritual issues don't really seem to be important, then I may not do any-
thing with that content. But if someone comes in and says something that I 
hear as a warning sign, I might want to refer to a trained chaplain to help sort 
that out. For example, a person may see God as punitive and spiritual assess-
ment may allow me to make a link between this attitude and the patient's not 
wanting to take medicines, or not taking care of him or herself. 62 
Spirituality becomes an occasion for intervention-in other words, 
its content becomes important-when it subverts the goals of medi-
cine. 63 
The endpoint of this logic of instrumentality is a consumerist or 
commodified approach to spirituality and religious practice. Health 
care itself is located in an ever increasingly consumerist culture. Not 
surprisingly, the increase in interest in spirituality over the past decade 
or so has paralleled the trend toward commodification of medicine 
itself. As Joel Shuman and Keith Meador have incisively noted: 
The movement in contemporary North American culture for a more reli-
gious medicine has more to do with the fact that both religion and medicine 
have become phenomena shaped by the consumerist ethos of late moder-
nity .... Religion and medicine are, in contemporary North American cul-
ture, means of achieving desirable goods external to their practice; both are 
increasingly viewed as means for self-interested individuals to attain the 
nearly universally desirable commodity that is individual health. Health is 
thus ... to borrow the language of Marxist critique, fetishized, meaning it is 
valued, pursued, and exchanged without reference to the persons or commu-
nities who produce it or to its proper place in a hierarchy of goods of a society 
committed of pursuing a substantive account of human flourishing. 64 
We find in the literature under consideration here a similar fetishiza-
tion of spirituality and religious practices. Unmoored from their tradi-
tional or communal sources, spiritual or religious practices became ser-
vices and coping options among which patients might choose-pastoral 
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counseling, meditation, energy work, chapel service, Reiki, Therapeutic 
Touch, yoga, anointing. Even anointing has not been immune; to some 
it has seemed offensive to limit anointing to Christians, when it ought 
rather be available to anyone who wants to experience the comforting 
touch of oil in the company of significant others to make the "feel bad" 
places in their bodies "feel good."65 Patients may choose some, all, or 
most importantly, none of the above. 66 
George Engel was, of course, a psychiatrist. Bishop notes that, in 
the 1970s, psychiatry (like medicine) was in crisis. Psychiatrists, appar-
ently, were not sure "whether the 'categories of human distress' that 
they treat are properly considered 'disease,"'67 lacking as they did at 
the time an identifiable biological basis. Somewhat surprisingly, Engel 
targets Christianity as the course of the problems with reductionistic, 
technological medicine. As Bishop notes: 
Engel does not repudiate Western science; he merely opposes the reduc-
tive nature of Western medicine. Rather than arguing that science itself 
is reductive, Engel lays the blame at the feet of a medical science that has 
been infected by a Christian dualism. The purported mind/body dualism 
of Christianity defines the body as a mechanism separate from the mind or 
soul, resulting, he argues, in a science that places too much emphasis on the 
physical body and too little on the psyche or on society. 68 
The invention of the biopsychosocialspiritual model was therefore 
not just a proposed solution to a crisis in medicine and psychiatry, nor 
was it solely a masked move to totalize the jurisdiction of medicine: via 
the subterfuge of encompassing spirituality, the biopsychosocialspiri-
tual model became a decisive weapon in the ongoing conflict between 
religion and the Masters of Suspicion who founded the field of psy-
chiatry. Consequently, it is not accidental that most of the research 
and writing in the field of spirituality and medicine is conducted by 
persons located within the disciplines of psychiatry, psychology, and 
counseling, and that spirituality and religion are, ultimately, reduced 
to psychological modes of coping. As medical ethics saved the life of 
philosophy, it could be argued that spirituality-as a component of 
the biopsychosocialspiritual model of medicine-played a key role in 
172 M. THERESE LYSAUGHT 
ousting religion and saving the life of psychiatry, catalyzing its promo-
tion to a mode of biopower, finally coequal with its medical counter-
parts." 
BEYOND BIOPOLITICS: THE EMBODIED 
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
It is plausible, thus, to suggest that the field of spirituality and medi-
cine has become part of the biopolitical matrix of medicine. As long as 
spirituality facilitates medicine's efficiency in serving the ends of the 
social order, it will be welcomed within the halls of the modern medi-
cal center. As long as it reproduces radically individualized consum-
ers, who understand themselves as primarily autonomous choosers or 
decision makers, and stays in its private, interiorized, subjective space, 
it will be considered legitimate and perhaps a necessary partner. If it 
does not, flags immediately go up. 
We find such flags in an essay by Stephen Post, Christina Puchalski, 
and David Larson entitled "Physicians and Patient Spirituality: Pro-
fessional Boundaries, Competency, and Ethics." As the title suggests, 
they here grapple with the thorny issues of "professional boundaries"-
a key question in the always-conflicted process ofbiopolitical disciplin-
ary formation.'0 The issue with which they grapple is a "serious ethical 
question [pertaining to] the actions of physicians who also wish to act 
as pastoral caregivers."" In a deeply revelatory passage, they suggest: 
[I]t is a general mandate of modern developed societies to keep professional 
roles separate. For example, one does not expect the clergy person who is also a 
licensed physician to wear his or her pastoral garb in the clinic when function-
ing as a clinician, nor the white physician's coat at religious service. {Yet the 
physician-minister or the physician who intends to proselytize, when serving 
in developing countries or in health care settings that are religious and clearly 
advertise themselves as such, may merge roles without controversy.) ... 
The pressure to blur the boundaries between the professions often comes 
from patients. For example, about half of patients indicate a desire to have 
physicians pray with them. If this finding is accurate, physicians might need 
to explain to patients why such activities usually better fall under the pur-
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view of competent pastoral care .... Over the past three decades, biomedi-
cal ethics has focused on demystifying the authority of the paternalistic, 
"priestly" physician of old, thereby allowing greater patient empowerment 
through autonomy and self-determination. 
Adding a sacred or religious mystique to the power of the physician is 
suspect. For example, we would not condone a Jesuit medical geneticist who 
maintains that it is appropriate and "nondirective" to wear his clerical col-
lar when doing reproductive genetic counseling in a non-Roman Catholic 
health care setting. Nor would we want the clinician in a nonreligious health 
care setting to raise the question, "Have you accepted the Lord?" Many 
patients would be confused and rightly offended.'" 
Many would be "rightly offended." When it comes to religious prac-
tices such as prayer-though not "spirituality"-Post and his col-
leagues are clearly unsettled by the prospect of fluid boundaries. 
Health care professionals are enjoined to be particularly vigilant in 
policing them. Not only might such boundary crossing be confusing; 
it would be offensive. Deeply seated-deeply embodied-sensibilities 
are at stake here. 
Yet not for all. It could be uncontroversial, the authors admit, for 
a clergy-physician to merge roles in a developing country. "About half 
of patients" would like their physicians to pray with them. Patients, in 
other words, are insufficiently "normalized." Thus, it falls to the phy-
sician (at least in the United States) to order them rightly, "to explain 
to [them] why such activities usually better fall under the purview of 
competent pastoral care." 
The passage from Post and colleagues reveals that more is 
going on in religious practices like anointing the sick than simply 
"meaning-making" or "coping." Rather, I would suggest that religious 
practices are equally disciplinary, equally embodied, equally political, 
but seeking to reproduce not citizens for contemporary society but 
rather adherents of a different social order, namely, faithful disciples 
for the church or members of the kingdom of God. Thus, Post and 
colleagues are quite right to be worried about the permeability of the 
boundaries where medicine and religious practice meet. A priest in 
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the ICU ought rightly be seen as a bizarre irruption of the church-of 
an alternative politics-in the domain of medicine. Indeed, practices 
like anointing are, essentially, practices of resistance. In their concrete, 
embodied, communal, public materiality, they cannot but resist the 
philosophical dualisms that shape the space in which they are permit-
ted to operate. Rooted in traditions and understood as ends in them-
selves, they resist instrumentalization and commodification. And, as 
oriented toward a radically different telos, they potentially provide a 
concretely embodied means to resist cultural hegemony. 
Thus, it is not only the case that the field of spirituality and medi-
cine construes both spirituality and religion in ways deeply counter to 
normative Christian understandings ofitself, of sickness, health, heal-
ing, spirituality, religion, divorced from theological contexts of belief, 
practice, and community-to the point that theologians and religious 
practices like anointing of the sick can find little if any place in this 
literature. It is not only the case that the field has failed to consult with 
those with real theological expertise. It is not only the case that theolo-
gians have dropped the ball in seeking to participate in this field. 
Rather, they were edged out, just as the theologians were edged out 
of bioethics. It happened to them unawares, under the most benign 
and deceptive of auspices-that of making space for patients' reli-
gious preferences in the clinical setting as a way of attending to their 
care, promoting their wholistic healing, and providing meaning in 
their dying. The agenda, then, is before us. Seeking to infuse the field 
of spirituality and medicine with more accurate and substantive theo-
logical content, with more intellectual rigor regarding the realities of 
spirituality and religion will not be enough. At stake is a contest of 
polities, of regimes of truth, waged via the bodies of patients and the 
populace. Those committed to questions of religion and medicine are 
challenged to begin to attend in a more careful historical, sociological, 
and theoretical way to the particular continent historical forces that 
gave rise to the field of spirituality and medicine, including the politi-
cal commitments of the particular context in which it arose both within 
society as well as within the realm of medicine. We are challenged to 
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unmask the arbitrary nature of the field's normative structure as well 
as the dubious scientific status of many of its claims. Equally, we are 
challenged to come to a deeper appreciation of political dimensions of 
religious traditions particularly as they are enacted through embodied 
engagement with adherents. It may well be our own failure to under-
stand the power and complexity of our own traditions that enabled 
their deformed marginalization. 
We find this power and complexity, I think, in the very practices of 
our traditions. In many ways, they speak more powerfully than any 
analyses, though they speak quietly and we tend not to listen. Such 
witness is given by John Carmody, whose experience of anointing 
opened these reflections. For I think in his conclusion he captures 
precisely this truth, that an embodied practice like anointing the sick 
is not simply a health technology in service of "meaning," but rather 
is an embodied politics-a practice by which the sick are claimed or 
reclaimed by the church. He concludes: 
Lying in my narrow hospital bed, feeling the oil of gladness and healing, I 
knew I had little time. More importantly, though, I felt, by a wondrous grace, 
that this was the first time in my effective memory that the church ... was 
praying for me individually, by name, to deal with painful circumstances, 
suffering, and needs uniquely my own .... 
[With anointing,] [s]omething maternal really did appear. I truly felt 
taken to the bosom of a holy family that cared for me. It knew about my 
muscle spasms and my dismal prognosis. It loved me despite my many 
manifest failings and my worst secret sins .... [I]t was a community of 
prayer, offering the praise and petition that have always been its primary 
reason to be. And, for what seemed to me to be the first time, I, little John, 
weak John, competent John, mixed-up John, strong John, very sick John 
had a name in this community. My pain grieved it. My dying would sad-
den and diminish it. I mattered .... [T]he church at prayer in my anoint-
ing said, . .. 11Come close, into our embrace. Become part of the commu-
nion of saints as we intercede for you to God. "73 
In anointing, John Carmody found himself reconciled to his mother, 
the church. 
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The practice of anointing, then, ought well be seen as deeply sub-
versive of the contemporary configuration of spirituality and medi-
cine, and maybe even of medicine itself. The sacrament of anointing 
is, indeed, a practice through which patients, families, and sometimes 
even health professionals find comfort, meaning, and strength to cope 
with their situation. But more importantly, in the sacrament of anoint-
ing of the sick, the church walks into the clinic and claims its own. 
As the church, as an institutional political body, it cannot help but 
to challenge the biopolitics of medicine-to break through the well-
policed boundaries that not only keep spirituality in the service of 
medicine but that discipline patients in service of ends not their own. 
As such, anointing might prove not only to be subversive of spiritual-
ity and medicine; it might indeed be its salvation. 
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